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Abstract
We show that financial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are intimately linked.
A bailout benefits the economy by ameliorating the under-investment problem of the
financial sector. However, increasing taxation of the non-financial sector to fund the
bailout may be inefficient since it weakens its incentive to invest, decreasing growth.
Instead, the sovereign may choose to fund the bailout by diluting existing government
bondholders, resulting in a deterioration of the sovereign’s creditworthiness. This dete-
rioration feeds back to the financial sector, reducing the value of its guarantees and ex-
isting bond holdings as well as increasing its sensitivity to future sovereign shocks. We
provide empirical evidence for this two-way feedback between financial and sovereign
credit risk using data on the credit default swaps (CDS) of the Eurozone countries and
their banks for 2007-11. We show that the announcement of financial sector bailouts
was associated with an immediate, unprecedented widening of sovereign CDS spreads
and narrowing of bank CDS spreads; however, post-bailouts there emerged a signifi-
cant co-movement between bank CDS and sovereign CDS, even after controlling for
banks’ equity performance, the latter being consistent with an effect of the quality of
sovereign guarantees on bank credit risk.
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1 Introduction
Just three ago, there was essentially no sign of sovereign credit risk in the developed economies
and a prevailing view was that this was unlikely to be a concern for them in the near future.
Recently, however, sovereign credit risk has become a significant problem for a number of de-
veloped countries, most notably in Europe. In this paper, we are motivated by three closely
related questions surrounding this development. First, were the financial sector bailouts an
integral factor in igniting the rise of sovereign credit risk in the developed economies? We
show that they were. Second, what was the exact mechanism that caused the transmission
of risks between the financial sector and the sovereign? To understand this, we propose a
model wherein the government can finance a bailout through both increased taxation and
via dilution of existing government debt-holders. The bailout is beneficial; it alleviates a
distortion in the provision of financial services. However, both financing channels are costly.
Increased taxation reduces the non-financial sector’s incentives to invest. Therefore, when
the optimal bailout is large, dilution can become a relatively attractive option, leading to de-
terioration in the sovereign’s creditworthiness. Finally, we ask whether there is also feedback
going in the other direction– does sovereign credit risk feed back to the financial sector? We
explain – and verify empirically – that such a feedback is indeed present, due to the financial
sector’s implicit and explicit guarantees and holdings of sovereign bonds.
Our results call into question the usually implicit assumption that government resources
are vastly deep and that the main problem posed by bailouts is that of moral hazard –
that is, the distortion of future financial sector incentives. While the moral hazard cost is
certainly pertinent, our conclusion is that bailout costs are not just in the future. They are
tangible right around the timing of bailouts and are priced into the sovereign’s credit risk
and cost of borrowing. Thus, aggressive bailout packages that stabilize financial sectors in
the short run but ignore the ultimate taxpayer cost might end up being a Pyrrhic victory.
Motivation: The case of Irish bailout. On September 30, 2008 the government of Ireland
announced that it had guaranteed all deposits of the six of its biggest banks. The immediate
reaction that grabbed newspaper headlines the next day was whether such a policy of a full
savings guarantee was anti-competitive in the Euro area. However, there was something
deeper manifesting itself in the credit default swap (CDS) markets for purchasing protection
against the sovereign credit risk of Ireland and that of its banks. Figure 1 shows that while
the cost of purchasing such protection on Irish banks – their CDS fee – fell overnight from
around 400 basis points (bps) to 150 bps, the CDS fee for the Government of Ireland rose
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sharply. Over the next month, this rate more than quadrupled to over 100 bps and within
six months reached 400 bps, the starting level of its financial firms’ CDS. While there was
a general deterioration of global economic health over this period, the event-study response
in Figure 1 suggests that the risk of the financial sector was substantially transferred to the
government balance sheet, a cost that Irish taxpayers must eventually bear.
Viewed in the Fall of 2010, this cost rose to dizzying heights prompting economists to
wonder if the precise manner in which bank bailouts were awarded had rendered the financial
sector rescue exorbitantly expensive. Just one of the Irish banks, Anglo Irish, has cost the
government up to Euro 25 billion (USD 32 billion), amounting to 11.26% of Ireland’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Ireland’s finance minister Brian Lenihan justified the propping up
of the bank “to ensure that the resolution of debts does not damage Ireland’s international
credit-worthiness and end up costing us even more than we must now pay.” Nevertheless,
rating agencies and credit markets revised Ireland’s ability to pay future debts significantly
downward. The original bailout cost estimate of Euro 90 billion was re-estimated to be 50%
higher and the Irish 10-year bond spread over German bund widened significantly, ultimately
leading to a bailout of Irish government by the stronger Eurozone countries.1
This episode is not isolated to Ireland though it is perhaps the most striking case. In
fact, a number of Western economies that bailed out their banking sectors in the Fall of
2008 have experienced, in varying magnitudes, similar risk transfer between their financial
sector and government balance-sheets. Our paper develops a theoretical model and provides
empirical evidence that help understand this interesting phenomenon.
Model. Our theoretical model consists of two sectors of the economy – “financial” and
“corporate” (more broadly this includes also the household and other non-financial parts of
the economy), and a government. The two sectors contribute jointly to produce aggregate
output: the corporate sector makes productive investments and the financial sector invests in
intermediation “effort” (e.g., information gathering and capital allocation) that enhance the
return on corporate investments. Both sectors, however, face a potential under-investment
problem. The financial sector is leveraged (in a crisis, it may in fact be insolvent) and
under-invests in its contributions due to the well-known debt overhang problem (Myers,
1977). We assume that restructuring this financial sector debt is impossible or prohibitively
expensive. For simplicity, the corporate sector is un-levered. However, if the government
1See “Ireland’s banking mess: Money pit – Austerity is not enough to avoid scrutiny by the markets”,
the Economist, Aug 19th 2010; “S&P downgrades Ireland” by Colin Barr, CNNMoney.com, Aug 24th 2010;
and, “Ireland stung by S&P downgrade”, Reuters, Aug 25th, 2010.
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undertakes a “bailout” of the financial sector, in other words, makes a transfer from the
rest of the economy that results in a net reduction of the financial sector debt, then the
transfer must be funded in the future (at least in part) through taxation of corporate profits.
Such taxation, assumed to be proportional to corporate sector output, induces the corporate
sector to under-invest.
A government that is fully aligned with maximizing the economy’s current and future
output determines the optimal size of the bailout. We show that tax proceeds that can be
used to fund the bailout have, in general, a Laffer curve property (as the tax rate is varied),
so that the optimal bailout size and tax rate are interior. In practice, governments fund
bailouts in the short run by borrowing or issuing bonds, which are repaid by future taxation.
There are two interesting constraints on the bailout size that emerge from this observation.
One, the greater is the existing debt of the government, the lower is its ability to undertake
a bailout. This is because the Laffer curve of tax proceeds leaves less room for the government
to increase tax rates for repaying its bailout-related debt. Second, the announcement of the
bailout lowers the price of government debt due to the anticipated dilution from newly issued
debt. Interestingly, if the financial sector of the economy has assets in place that are in the
form of government bonds (which is typically the case), then the bailout is in fact associated
with some “collateral damage” for the financial sector itself.2 Illustrating the possibility of
such a two-way feedback is a novel contribution of our model.
If the financial sector crisis is severe and existing government debt is large, then the
under-investment cost of fully funding with tax revenue both existing government debt and
a bailout are high, and the government may undertake a strategic default. Assuming that
there are some deadweight costs of such default, for example, due to international sanctions or
from being unable to borrow in debt markets for some time, we derive the optimal boundary
for sovereign default as a function of its pre-bailout debt and the financial sector’s liabilities.
This boundary explains that a heavily-indebted sovereign faced with a heavily-insolvent
financial sector will be forced to “sacrifice its credit rating” to save the financial sector and
at the same time sustain economic growth.
We then extend the model to allow for uncertainty about the realized output growth of
the corporate sector. This introduces a possibility of solvency-based default on government
debt. Interestingly, given the collateral damage channel, an increase in uncertainty about
2For example, in mid 2011 the exposure of UniCredit and Intesa (two big Italian banks) to Italian bonds
was 121 percent and 175 of their core capital. In Spain, the ratios for the two biggest banks, BBVA and
Santander, were 193 percent and 76 percent, respectively. See “Europe’s Banks Struggle With Weak Bonds”
by Landon Thomas Jr., NYTimes.com, August 3, 2011.
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the sovereign’s economic output not only lowers its own debt values but also increases the
financial sector’s risk of default. This is because the financial sector’s government bond
holdings fall in value, and (in an extension of the model) so do the value of the government
guarantees accorded to the financial sector as a form of bailout. In turn, these channels
induce a post-bailout co-movement between the financial sector’s credit risk and that of the
sovereign, even though the immediate effect of the bailout is to lower the financial sector’s
credit risk and raise that of the sovereign.
Empirics. Our empirical work analyzes this two-way feedback between the financial sector
and sovereign credit risk. Our analysis focuses mainly on the Western European economies
during the financial crisis of 2007-11.
We examine sovereign and bank CDS in the period from 2007 to 2011 and find three
distinct periods. The first period covers the start of the financial crisis in January 2007
until the first bank bailout announcement. This period includes the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers. Across all Western economies, we see a large, sustained rise in bank CDS as the
financial crisis develops. However, sovereign CDS spreads remain very low. This evidence
is consistent with a significant increase in the default risk of the banking sector with little
effect on sovereigns in the pre-bailout period.
The second period covers the bank bailouts starting with the announcement of a bailout
in Ireland in late September 2008 and ending with a bailout in Sweden in late October 2008.
During this one-month period, we find a significant decline in bank CDS across all countries
and a corresponding increase in sovereign CDS. This evidence suggests that bank bailouts
produced a transfer of default risk from the banking sector to the sovereign.
The third period covers the period after the bank bailouts and until 2011. We find that
both sovereign and bank CDS increased during this period. Consistent with our model’s
predictions, the increase was larger for countries whose public debt ratios were higher and
whose financial sectors were more distressed in the pre-bailout period. Also consistent with
our prediction of bailout-induced dilution of debtholders, we find that there emerges post-
bailouts a strong, positive relationship between public debt ratios and sovereign CDS, though
none existed beforehand, confirming that the bailouts spilled banks’ credit risk onto the
sovereigns and triggered the rise in sovereign credit risk.
We then carry out a series of empirical tests to document and quantify the direct two-
way feedback between sovereign and financial credit risk emphasized by our model. The
tests show that in the post-bailout period an increase in sovereign credit risk is associated
with a robust and economically significant increase in the credit risk of that country’s banks,
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even after controlling for market-wide shocks to credit risk and volatility, ‘local’ CDS-market
conditions, common variation in bank CDS, and changes in bank-level fundamentals. The
additional impact of sovereign risk beyond these extensive controls arises–as per our model–
because of the special subsidy that government guarantees provide to bank debt-holders.
Finally, in support of the collateral damage channel as being potentially relevant for
the co-movement between financial sector and sovereign CDS, we collect bank-level data on
holdings of different sovereign government bonds released as part of the stress tests conducted
for European banks in 2010. We document that on average Eurozone banks stress-tested in
2010 had Eurozone government bond holdings that were as large as one-sixth of their risk-
weighted assets, and that bank CDS co-moves with different sovereign CDS in accordance
with banks’ holdings of the respective government bonds.
The developments in the sovereign debt crisis during the summer of 2011 have affirmed the
importance of the channels this paper highlights. In the Eurozone, sovereign CDS has risen
amid a growing threat of sovereign default, and this has in turn led to fears of a renewed
banking crisis. The channels we highlight have been at the core of these developments;
banks’ CDS has risen and their balance sheets damaged by losses on sovereign bond holdings
and by the drop in value of government guarantees and support.3 This has raised banks’
borrowing costs or shut them out of markets entirely, and has heightened fears of bank runs.
The Eurozone and ECB’s reaction, to provide greater bailouts to countries and support to
distressed banks, represents a repetition of the scenario modeled by our paper, but now with
a pan-European entity playing the role of the sovereign that sacrifices its creditworthiness
for the bailout. Indeed, CDS rates on the strongest Eurozone countries have responded by
rising noticeably, raising again the risk of a Pyrrhic victory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 presents the equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 provides empirical evidence and in conclusion
also discusses the case of Iceland as a possible counterfactual for the case of Ireland. Section
5 relates our theoretical and empirical analysis to the extant literature. Section 6 concludes.
All proofs not in the main text are in the online Appendix.
3Similarly, S&P’s downgrade of US Treasuries in August 2011 led to downgrades of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac and a rise in the CDS rates of US banks, insurance companies, other financial entities.
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2 Model
There are three time periods in the model: t = 0, 1, and 2. The productive economy consists
of two parts, a financial sector and a non-financial sector. In addition, there is a government
and a representative consumer. All agents are risk-neutral.
Financial sector: The operator of the financial sector solves the following problem, which
is to choose, at t = 0, the amount of financial services to supply in order to maximize his
expected payoff at t = 1, net of the effort cost required to produce these services:
max
ss0
E0
[(
wss
s
0 − L1 + A˜1 + AG + T0
)
× 1{−L1+A˜1+AG+T0>0}
]
− c(ss0) . (1)
The quantity ss0 is the amount of financial services supplied by the financial sector at t = 1.
The financial sector earns revenues at the rate of ws per unit of financial service supplied,
with ws determined in equilibrium. To produce s0 units, the operator of the financial sector
expends c(s0) units of effort. We assume that c
′(s0) > 0 and c′′(s0) > 0.
The financial sector has both liabilities and assets on its books. It receives the payoff from
its efforts only if the value of assets exceeds liabilities at t = 1. This solvency condition is
given in equation (1) by the indicator function for the expression {−L1 + A˜1 +AG+T0 > 0}.
L1 denotes the liabilities of the financial sector, which are due (mature) at t = 1. There are
two types of assets held by the financial sector, denoted A˜1 and AG. AG is the value of the
financial sector’s holdings of a fraction kA of the existing (pre-bailout) stock of government
bonds, while A˜1 represents the payoff of the other assets held by the financial sector.We model
the payoff A˜1, which is risky, as a continuously valued random variable that is realized at
t = 1 and takes values in [0,∞). The payoff and value of government bonds is discussed
below. The variable T0 represents the value of the transfer made by the government to the
financial sector at t = 0 and is also discussed further below. Finally, in case of insolvency,
debtholders receive ownership of all financial sector assets and wage revenue.
Non-financial sector: The non-financial sector comes into t = 0 with an existing capital
stock K0. Its objective is to maximize the sum of the expected values of its net payoffs,
which occur at t = 1 and t = 2:
max
sd0,K1
E0
[
f(K0, s
d
0)− wssd0 + (1− θ0)V˜ (K1)− (K1 −K0)
]
(2)
The function f is the production function of the non-financial sector, which takes as inputs at
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t = 0 the financial services it demands, sd0, and the capital stock, K0, to produce consumption
goods at t = 1. The output of f is deterministic and f is increasing in both arguments and
concave. At t = 1, the non-financial sector is faced with a decision of how much capital
K1 to invest, at an incremental cost of (K1 −K0), in a project V˜ , whose payoff is realized
at t = 2. This project represents the future or continuation value of the non-financial
sector and is in general subject to uncertainty. The expectation at t = 1 of this payoff
is V (K1) = E1[V˜ (K1)] and, as indicated, is a function of the investment K1. We assume
that V ′(K1) > 0 and V ′′(K1) < 0, so that the expected payoff is increasing but concave
in investment. A proportion θ0 of the payoff of the continuation project is taxed by the
government to pay its debt, both new and outstanding, as we explain next.
Government: The government’s objective is to maximize the total output of the economy
and hence the welfare of the consumer. It does this by reducing the debt overhang problem
of the financial sector, which induces it to supply more financial services, thereby increasing
output. To achieve this, the government issues bonds that it then transfers to the balance
sheet of the financial sector. These bonds are repaid with taxes levied on the non-financial
sector at a tax-rate of θ0.
4 In particular, the tax rate θ0 is set by the government at t = 0
and is levied at t = 2 upon realization of the payoff V˜ (K1). We assume that the government
credibly commits to this tax rate.
We let ND denote the number of bonds that the government has issued in the past –
its outstanding stock of debt. For simplicity, bonds have a face value of one, so the face
value of outstanding debt equals the number of bonds, ND. The government issues NT new
bonds, at an equilibrium-determined price P0, to accomplish the transfer to the financial
sector. Hence, at t = 2 the government receives realized taxes equal to θ0V˜ (K1) and then
uses them to pay bondholders NT + ND. We assume that if there are still tax revenues left
over (a surplus), the government spends them on programs for the representative consumer,
or equivalently, just rebates them to the consumer. On the other hand, if tax revenues fall
short of NT + ND, then the government defaults on its debt. In that case, it pays out all
the tax revenue raised to bondholders. We assume that the government credibly commits
to this payout policy. We further assume that default incurs a fixed deadweight loss of D.
Hence, default is costly and there is an incentive to avoid it.5
4Issuing bonds that are repaid with future taxes allows the government to smooth taxation over time.
We do not model the tax-smoothing considerations here but note that tax-smoothing would be optimal if,
for example, there is a convex cost of taxation in each time period.
5Although D here is obviously reduced-form, one can think of the deadweight cost in terms of loss
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The government’s objective is to maximize the expected utility of the representative
consumer, who consumes the combined output of the financial and non-financial sector.
Hence, the government faces the following problem:
max
θ0, NT
E0
[
f(K0, s0) + V˜ (K1)− c(s0)− (K1 −K0)− 1defD + A˜1
]
(3)
where s0 is the equilibrium provision of financial services. This maximization is subject
to the budget constraint T0 = P0NT and subject to the choices made by the financial and
non-financial sectors. Note that 1def is an indicator function that equals 1 if the government
defaults (if θ0V˜ (K1) < NT +ND) and 0 otherwise.
Consumer: The representative consumer consumes the output of the economy. He allocates
his wealth W between consumption and the bonds and equity of the government, financial
and non-financial sectors. Since the representative consumer is assumed to be risk-neutral
and there is no time discounting, asset prices equal the expected values of asset payouts. Let
P (i) and P˜ (i) denote the price and payoff of asset i, respectively. At t = 0, the consumer
chooses optimal portfolio allocations, {ni}, that solve the following problem:
max
ni
E0
[
ΣiniP˜ (i) + (W − ΣiniP (i))
]
(4)
The consumer’s first order condition gives the standard result that the equilibrium price of
an asset equals the expected value of its payoff, P (i) = E0[P˜ (i)].
3 Equilibrium Outcomes
We begin by examining the maximization problem (1) of the financial sector. Let p(A˜)
denote the probability density of A˜. Furthermore, let A1 be the minimum realization of A˜1
for which the financial sector does not default: A1 = L1 − AG − T0. Then, the first order
condition of the financial sector can be written as:
wspsolv − c′(ss0) = 0 (5)
where psolv ≡
∫∞
A1
p(A˜1)dA˜ is the probability that the financial sector is solvent at t = 1.
Henceforth, we parameterize c(s0) as follows: c(s0) = β
1
m
sm0 where m > 1.
of government reputation internationally, loss of domestic government credibility, degradation of the legal
system and so forth. If a country’s reputation is already weak, it will have less to lose from default.
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Consider now the problem of the non-financial sector at t = 0, given by (2). Its demand
for financial services, sˆd0, is determined by its first-order condition:
6
∂f(K0, s
d
0)
∂sd0
= ws . (6)
We parameterize f as Cobb-Douglas with the factor share of financial services given by ϑ:
f(K0, s0) = αK
1−ϑ
0 s
ϑ
0 .
In equilibrium the demand and supply of services are the same: sˆd0 = sˆ
s
0 . From here on,
we drop the superscripts and denote the equilibrium quantity of services simply by s0.
3.1 Transfer Reduces Underprovision of Financial Services
Taken together, the first-order conditions of the financial sector (5) and non-financial sector
(6) show how debt overhang impacts the provision of financial services by the financial sector.
The marginal benefit of an extra unit of services to the economy is given by ws, while the
marginal cost, c′(s0), is less than ws if there is a positive probability of insolvency. This
implies that the equilibrium allocation is sub-optimal. The reason is that the possibility of
liquidation psolv < 1 drives a wedge between the social and private marginal benefit of an
increase in the provision of services. As long as psolv < 1, there is an under-provision of
financial services relative to the first-best case (psolv = 1). Hence, we obtain that
Lemma 1. An increase in the transfer T0 leads to an increase in the provision of financial
services since this raises the probability psolv that the financial sector is solvent at t = 1.
3.2 Tax Revenues: A Laffer Curve
Next, to understand the government’s problem in (3), we first look at how expected tax
revenue responds to the tax rate, θ0. Let the expected tax revenue, θ0V (K1), be denoted by
T . Raising taxes has two effects. On the one hand, an increase in the tax rate θ0 captures a
larger proportion of the future value of the non-financial sector, thereby raising tax revenues.
On the other hand, this reduces the incentive of the non-financial sector to invest in its future,
thereby leading to reduced investment, K1. At the extreme, when θ0 = 1, the tax distortion
6Both the second-order conditions of the financial and non-financial sectors are satisfied: −c′′(s0) < 0
and
∂2f(K0,s
d
0)
∂2sd0
< 0.
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eliminates the incentive for investment and tax revenues are reduced to zero. Hence, tax
revenues are non-monotonic in the tax rate and maximized by a tax rate strictly less than 1.
Formally, the impact on tax revenue of an increase in the tax rate is given by:
dT
dθ0
= V (K1) + θ0V
′(K1)
dK1
dθ0
. (7)
Note that at θ0 = 0, an increase in the tax rate increases the tax revenue at a rate equal to
V (K1), the future value of the non-financial sector. It can be shown that since the production
function V (K1) is concave, as taxes are increased the incentive to invest is decreased by the
tax rate, that is dK1
dθ0
< 0. To see this, consider the first-order condition for investment of the
non-financial sector at t = 1:
(1− θ0)V ′(K1)− 1 = 0 . (8)
Taking the derivative with respect to θ0 using the Implicit Function theorem gives:
dK1
dθ0
=
V ′(K1)
(1−θ0)V ′′(K1) < 0.
7 Since at θ0 = 1 the tax revenue is zero this implies that the marginal
tax revenue decreases until it eventually becomes negative. Hence, tax revenues satisfy the
Laffer curve property as a function of the tax rate:
Lemma 2. The tax revenues, θ0V (K1), increase in the tax rate, θ0, as it increases from zero
(no taxes), and then eventually decline.
Henceforth, we parameterize V with the functional form V (K1) = K
γ
1 , 0 < γ < 1.
8 As
Appendix A.3 shows, T = θt+1γ
γ
1−γ (1− θt+1)
γ
1−γ . It can then be shown that:
Lemma 3. The tax revenue, T , is maximized at θmax0 = (1− γ), is increasing (dT /dθ0 > 0)
and concave (d2T /dθ20 < 0) on [0, θmax0 ), and decreasing (dT /dθ0 < 0) on (θmax0 , 1).
7While we have chosen to model the tax-induced distortion in investment, a tax on the non-financial
sector’s labor income would have a similar effect if the sector makes a labor-leisure trade-off. In that case,
the tax on labor income decreases the marginal benefit from labor, thereby reducing the equilibrium labor
choice and resulting output. More generally, we may broadly interpret the investment K1 as going beyond
investment in capital to include e.g., the investment of entrepreneurial effort and other human capital.
8This functional form is a natural choice for an increasing and concave function of K1. Appendix A.2
provides a more structural motivation for this choice based on the calculation of a continuation value un-
der our choice of production function. This calculation suggests that the continuation value implied by a
multiperiod model should take a similar functional form.
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3.3 Optimal Transfer Under Certainty and No Default
We analyze next the government’s decision starting first with a simplified version of the
general setup. We make two simplifying assumptions: (A1) we set to zero the variance of
the realized future value of the non-financial sector, so that V˜ (K1) = V (K1); (A2) we force
the government to remain solvent. In subsequent sections we remove these assumptions.
If the government must remain solvent, it can only issue a number of bonds NT that it can
pay off in full, given its tax revenue. By assumption (A1), the tax revenue is known exactly
(it is equal to T ), and hence by assumption (A2), NT + ND = T . Moreover, since every
bond has a sure payoff of 1, we know that the bond price is P0 = 1. Then the transfer to the
financial sector is T0 = θ0V (K1) − ND and there is no probability of default, E[1def ] = 0.
Hence, the only choice variable for the government in this case is the tax rate. Appendix
A.4 shows that the first-order condition for the government can be expressed in terms of the
choice of transfer size (T0) and expected tax revenue (T ), rather than in terms of the tax
rate, and equates the marginal gain (G) and marginal loss (L) of increasing tax revenue:
dG
dT +
dL
dT = 0 ,where (9)
dG
dT =
∂f(K0, s0)
∂s0
(1− psolv) ds0
dT0
, and
dL
dT = θ0V
′(K1)
dK1
dT .
The term dG/dT in (9) is the marginal gain to the economy of increasing expected tax
revenue, which in turn increases the provision of financial services (since ds0/dT0 > 0) .
This marginal gain will be large when psolv is low, that is, when the financial sector is at
high risk of insolvency and debt overhang is significant. The term dL/dT in (9) is the
marginal underinvestment loss to the economy due to a marginal increase in expected tax
revenue, which distorts the non-financial sector’s incentive to invest as long as the tax rate
is positive. Formally, since dK1/dT < 0, then dL/dT < 0. Then, the following proposition,
which describes the solution to the government’s problem under assumptions (A1)-(A2) and
m ≥ 2ϑ, is proven in Appendix A.6:
Proposition 1. There is a unique optimal tax rate, θˆ0, which is strictly less than θ
max
0 .
The newly issued sovereign debt has face value NT = Tˆ − ND, where Tˆ represents the tax
revenues. Moreover,
1. The optimal tax rate and revenue are increasing in L1, the financial sector liabilities,
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and in ND, the outstanding government debt.
2. The face value of newly issued sovereign debt (the transfer) is increasing in the fi-
nancial sector liabilities L1, but decreasing in the amount of existing government debt
ND. Moreover, the gross transfer, T0 + kAND, is also decreasing in ND.
The optimal tax rate is less than θmax0 due to the Laffer-curve property of tax revenues.
In addition, if there is any debt overhang (i.e., psolv < 1), then the optimal tax rate will be
strictly greater than zero, since at a zero tax rate there is a marginal benefit to having a
transfer but no marginal cost.
Consider the two parts of Proposition 1.
For any level of transfer, the marginal gain from the transfer is greater the more severe
is the debt overhang, since a lower probability of solvency increases the distortion in the
provision of financial services. Therefore, as (1) and (2) of Proposition 1 state, an increase in
L1, the financial sector liabilities, leads to a higher tax rate, more tax revenue, and greater
issuance of new sovereign debt to fund a larger transfer.
If the level of pre-existing government debt (ND) is increased, there is again a greater
marginal gain from the transfer since for any level of tax revenue, the effective transfer (T0)
is smaller, and therefore the probability of solvency of the financial sector is lower. As (1)
of Proposition 1 states, this pushes the government to increase the optimal tax rate, tax
revenue, and overall amount of sovereign debt.
However, as (2) of Proposition 1 shows, the rate of increase in total sovereign debt is less
than the increase in ND. Hence, under the no-default and certainty assumptions, (A1)-(A2),
an increase in existing government debt corresponds to a decrease in newly issued sovereign
debt and a smaller transfer T0. The reason for this decrease is that the underinvestment cost
of raising additional tax revenues is increasing.9
3.4 Default Under Certainty
Now we allow the government to deviate from the no-default choice of setting NT = T −ND.
Increasing NT above this threshold has both an associated cost and benefit. The benefit is
that this can increase the transfer to the financial sector. Recall that the transfer T0 equals
P0NT , where P0 = max(1, T /(NT + ND)) is the price of the government bond. The cost is
9Later, we show that the possibility of default or the introduction of uncertainty can alter this result.
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that when NT > T −ND, the government will not be able to fully cover its obligations. In
that case, P0 < 1 and the government will default, triggering the dead-weight loss of D.
Hence, the government’s decision on how many new bonds to issue, NT , splits the decision
space into two regions: (1) No Default: NT = T − ND and 1def = 0; and (2) Default:
NT > T −ND and 1def = 1.
As shown in Appendix A.7, if the choice to default is made, then it is optimal for the
government to issue an infinite amount of new debt in order to fully dilute existing debt (P0
becomes 0) and hence capture all tax revenues towards the transfer. The resulting situation
is the same as if existing debt ND had been set to zero. Therefore, to determine whether
defaulting is optimal, the government evaluates whether its objective function for given ND
and no default exceeds by at least D (the deadweight default cost) its objective function
with ND set to zero. Formally, let Wno def denote the maximum value of the government’s
objective function conditional on no default, Wdef denote the maximum value conditional on
default, and W = max(Wno def ,Wdef ). The following lemma, which is proved in Appendix
A.7, characterizes the optimal government action and resulting equilibrium:
Lemma 4. Conditional on default, it is optimal to set NT → ∞ (and hence P0 → 0).
This implies that Wdef = Wno def
∣∣
ND=0
− D. Moreover, if default is undertaken then (1)
the optimal tax rate is lower, θˆdef0 < θˆ
no def
0 ; (2) provided that kAND < Tˆ def , the gross
transfer is bigger, Tˆ0
def
> Tˆ0
no def
+ kAND; and, (3) equilibrium provision of financial
services is higher, sˆ0
def > sˆ0
no def .
Figure 2 displays the optimal default boundary in L1 × ND space along with the No-
Default and Default regions. The following proposition characterizes how a number of factors
push the sovereign towards default, or in other words, move it closer to the default boundary.
Proposition 2. Ceteris paribus, the benefit to defaulting is:
1. increasing in the financial sector liabilities L1 (severity of debt overhang) and the
amount of existing government debt ND
2. decreasing in the dead-weight default cost D, and in the fraction of existing govern-
ment debt held by the financial sector kA.
Appendix A.8 provides the proof. Consider a worsening of the financial sector’s health,
leading to a decreased provision of financial services. This increases the marginal gain from
further government transfer, and, in turn, increases the gain to the sovereign from defaulting.
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This is represented by a move towards the right in Figure 2, decreasing the distance to the
default boundary. An increase in existing debt implies a bigger spread between the optimal
transfer and tax revenue with and without default. Both the extra transfer and decreased
underinvestment represent benefits to defaulting. This is represented by a move upwards in
Figure 2, again decreasing the distance to the default-boundary.
It is clear that an increase in the deadweight loss raises the threshold for default.
Finally, and importantly, an increase in the fraction of existing sovereign debt held by
the financial sector also raises the threshold for default since the act of defaulting, which is
aimed at freeing up resources towards the transfer, causes collateral damage to the financial
sector balance sheet. From the vantage point of Figure 2, both an increase in D and kA
cause an outward shift in the default boundary.
3.4.1 Two-way Feedback
Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that there is a two-way feedback between the solvency situation
of the financial sector and of the sovereign. First, by Proposition 1, a severe deterioration
in the financial sector’s probability of solvency (e.g., an increase in L1) leads to a large
expansion in new debt (NT ) by the sovereign, as it acts to mitigate the under-provision
of financial services. Since the marginal cost of raising the tax revenue (dL/dT ) to fund
this debt expansion is increasing, the sovereign is pushed closer to the decision to default
(Proposition 2), as well as is its maximum debt capacity (Lemma 3). Hence, a financial
sector crisis pushes the sovereign towards distress.
Going in the other direction, by Proposition 1, a distressed sovereign, e.g., one with high
existing debt (ND), will have a financial sector with a worse solvency situation. This is
because it is very costly for such a sovereign to fund increased debt to make the transfer to
the financial sector. Hence, a more distressed sovereign will tend to correspond to a more
distressed financial sector (lower post-transfer psolv). Strategically defaulting is an avenue for
a distressed sovereign to free debt capacity for additional transfer. However, large holdings
of sovereign debt (kA) by the financial sector mean that taking this avenue simultaneously
causes collateral damage to the balance sheet of the financial sector, limiting the benefit
from this option (Proposition 2). In this case, a distressed sovereign is further incapacitated
in its ability to strengthen the solvency of its financial sector.
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3.5 Uncertainty, Default, and Pricing
We now introduce uncertainty about future output (i.e., growth) by allowing the variance
of V˜ (K1) to be nonzero. Instead of a binary default vs. no-default decision, the government
now implicitly chooses a continuous probability of default when it sets the tax rate and new
debt issuance. In this case, if raising taxes further incurs a large under-investment loss, the
government can choose to increase debt issuance while holding the tax rate constant. This
dilutes the claim of existing bondholders to tax revenues, thereby generating a larger transfer
without inducing further underinvestment. The trade-off is an increase in the government’s
probability of default and expected dead-weight default loss. In this case, the sovereign
effectively ‘sacrifices’ its own creditworthiness to improve the solvency of the financial sector,
leading to a ‘spillover’ of the financial sector crisis onto the credit risk of the sovereign.
Although θ0 and NT , are the variables the government directly chooses, it is more en-
lightening to look at two other variables that map one-to-one to them. The first variable is
T , which again equals θ0V (K1), the expected tax revenue. The second variable is:
H =
NT +ND
T . (10)
In words, H is the ratio of outstanding debt to expected tax revenue. It is the sovereign’s
“insolvency ratio”, i.e. its ability to cover its total debt at face value. The government’s
problem (3) then is equivalent to optimally choosing T andH.10 Note that the no-default and
total-default cases under certainty correspond to setting H = 1 and H →∞, respectively.
To represent uncertainty we write V˜ (K1) = V (K1)R˜V , where R˜V ≥ 0 represents the
shock to V˜ (K1). By construction, E[R˜V ] = 1. We also assume that the distribution of R˜V
is independent of the variables K1, θ0, and NT .
Pricing, Default Probability and the Transfer: Using H we can easily express the
sovereign’s bond price, P0, and probability of default, pdef , as follows:
P0 = E0
[
min
(
1,
θ0V˜ (K1)
NT +ND
)]
= E0
[
min
(
1,
1
H
R˜V
)]
, (11)
pdef = prob
(
θ0V˜ (K1) < NT +ND
)
= prob
(
R˜V < H
)
. (12)
10Formally, the mapping from θ0 to T is invertible on [0, θmax0 ] (as before, we can limit our concern to
this region) and given T , the mapping from H to NT is invertible. Hence, these alternative control variables
map uniquely to the original ones on the region of interest.
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Note that these quantities depend only on H and do not directly change with T . Next, as
NT = (T −ND/H)H, we can express the transfer in terms of T and H:
T0 = NTP0 = (T − ND
H
)E0
[
min
(
H, R˜V
)]
. (13)
The Optimal Probability of Default: Appendix A.9 and A.10 derive the first-order
conditions for T and H, respectively. The first-order condition for T , the expected tax
revenues, involves the same transfer-underinvestment trade-off as under certainty (adjusted
to account for H). Varying H, the sovereign’s insolvency ratio, involves a new trade-off.
Raising H increases the transfer by diluting existing bondholders–it raises outstanding debt
but without increasing expected tax revenue. This captures a greater faction of tax revenues
towards the transfer but raises the sovereign’s probability of default.
The top panel of Figure 3 illustrates the marginal gain (solid line) and loss (dashed
line) incurred by increasing H for a fixed level of T .11 The marginal cost of an increase
in H is the rise in expected dead-weight default cost. This is shown by the dashed green
line in Figure 3. Figure 3 indicates that (with T held constant) there are two potential
candidates for the optimal choice of H. The first is the value of H at which the gain and loss
curves intersect. The second is to let H →∞, representing a total default and full dilution
of existing bondholders. The bottom panel of Figure 3 plots the corresponding value of
the government’s objective as a function of H. The plot shows that for the configuration
displayed, a relatively small value of H achieves the optimum, which is at the intersection
of the gain and loss curves in the top panel. As this optimal H is above the lower end of
the support of R˜V (which is the origin in the figure), it corresponds to an optimal non-zero
probability of default. Note that above the upper end of the support of R˜V , the objective
function again rises in H, because once debt issuance is large enough that default is certain,
it is optimal for the government to fully dilute existing bondholders to obtain the largest
possible transfer. Finally, the dash-dot curves in Figure 3 show a case with an increase in
L1 (more severe debt overhang in the financial sector) relative to the solid lines.
3.5.1 Comparative Statics Under Uncertainty
The following proposition characterizes how different factors impact Hˆ and Tˆ , the govern-
ment’s optimal choices of H and T in equilibrium:
11To generate the plots we let R˜V have a uniform distribution.
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Proposition 3. If (Tˆ , Hˆ) is an interior solution to the government’s problem on a region of
the parameter space, then the insolvency ratio Hˆ is increasing in the financial sector’s lia-
bilities L1, in the amount of existing government debt ND and decreasing in the deadweight
cost of default D. Furthermore, expected tax proceeds Tˆ are also increasing in L1.
Figure 4 plots comparative statics of the equilibrium (optimal) values of T , H, T0, and
P0 as L1 and ND are varied. The discontinuities that appears in the plots, as indicated by
the dotted lines, represent the point at which total default becomes optimal.
The top panel of Figure 4 varies L1. It shows that T increases in L1, up to the point where
the sovereign chooses total default. The corresponding plot for H tells a different story. For
low levels of L1, H is held constant at a low value. This value corresponds to the lower end
of the support of R˜V , so the probability of sovereign default remains 0. Correspondingly, the
plot shows that in this range, the bond price P0 remains fully valued at 1. For sufficiently
high L1 (e.g., financial crisis), the government chooses to increase H. It ‘sacrifices’ its own
creditworthiness in order to achieve a larger transfer. The increase in the transfer is apparent
in the subplot for T0, while the damage to the sovereign’s creditworthiness is apparent in the
plot for P0, which begins to decrease once H begins to rise.
The plots also show that when the financial sector’s situation is severe enough (L1 is
large), the optimal government response can be a total default, illustrated in the plots at
the point of the dotted line. As in the certainty case, total default fully dilutes existing
bondholders, freeing extra capacity for the sovereign to generate the transfer. This leads to
a jump up in T0 and a jump down in T . At the same time, P0 drops to 0.
The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the comparative statics for ND. It is apparent that
for low levels of existing (i.e., pre-bailout) debt the sovereign keeps H constant at the low
end of its support, so there is no probability of default and P0 remains at 1. For these values
of ND, the government funds the transfer exclusively through increases in tax revenues. Note
that in this range the transfer is decreasing in ND, similar to the case of certainty. Once
ND is sufficiently high, the underinvestment costs of increasing tax revenue become so high
that the sovereign begins to increase H to fund the transfer. Consequently, the probability
of default rises and P0 begins to decrease, as shown in the plot. Interestingly, in this range
the combination of increased H and T imply that the transfer is actually increasing in ND.
The reason for this is that for large ND, the dilution of existing bondholders is an effective
channel for increasing the transfer. Moreover, as the plots show, at high enough ND, total
default becomes optimal.
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3.6 Government ‘Guarantees’
We now consider a final extension. Explicit government guarantees of financial sector debt
have been a part of a number of countries’ financial sector bailouts, notably Ireland. More-
over, it has been common for sovereigns to step in to prevent the liquidation of banks by
guaranteeing their debt, which strongly suggests that there is an implicit ‘safety net’.12
To capture this, we add to the model a simple notion of a government guarantee of
financial sector debt. We do this for two reasons. First, guarantees are a measure that
serves to prevent liquidation of the financial sector by debtholders, which is a necessary
pre-condition for increasing the provision of financial services. Second, guarantees are rather
unique in that, by construction, their benefit is targeted at debt holders and not equity
holders. This unique feature is important in helping us identify empirically a direct feedback
between sovereign and financial sector credit risk. In the interest of simplicity, and since debt
overhang alleviation is the central feature of bailouts in the model, we do not explore the
feedback of the guarantees on the transfer and taxation decisions analyzed above. Instead,
we simply set the stage for implications of the guarantees for our empirical strategy.
3.6.1 Avoiding Liquidation
We model debtholders as potentially liquidating (or inducing a run on) the financial sector
if they are required to incur losses in case of financial sector default. To prevent debtholders
from liquidating, the government ‘guarantees’ their debt. That is, it pledges to bondholders
L1− A˜1−T0 from tax revenues in case of insolvency. The guarantee is pari-passu with other
claims on tax revenue. Hence, the guarantee has the same credit risk as other claims on the
sovereign. In fact, the guarantee is just equivalent to a claim that issues L1 − A˜1 − T0 new
government bonds to debt holders in case of insolvency.
Note that this claim accrues exclusively to debtholders and not to equityholders. This
differentiates it from general assets of the financial sector, such as the asset paying A˜1 or
the transfer, T0. Importantly, a change in the value of general assets of the firm changes
the value of equity and debt in a certain proportion, while a change in the value of the
guarantee changes the value of debt but not the value of equity. This implies that, if there
are guarantees, the change in equity value will not be sufficient for determining the change
in debt value. The following proposition gives a formal statement of this, derived under a
12The fallout from the failure of Lehman brothers and the apparent desire to prevent a repeat of this
experience has strongly reinforced this view.
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uniform distribution for A˜1 (same as used above to generate the figures).
Proposition 4. Let D be the value of debt, E the value of equity, and A˜1 ∼ U [Amin, Amax].
In the absence of a guarantee, the return on equity is sufficient for knowing the return on
debt. In contrast, in the presence of a guarantee, the return on debt is a bivariate function
of both the return on equity and the return on the sovereign bond price.
This bivariate dependence is approximated by the following relation:
dD
D
≈ (1− psolv)(1− P0)
psolv
E
D
dE
E
+
(1− psolv)2(Amax − Amin)
2
P0
D
dP0
P0
, (14)
which is derived in the Appendix A.13. The term involving the equity return (dE
E
) captures
the impact on the debt value of any changes in the value of the general pool of assets of the
firm, including changes in the firm’s expected future profits. This type of result goes back
to Merton (1974), where the changes in both the debt and equity value reflect the change in
the total value of the firm. In the presence of a guarantee, there is an additional component,
which picks up the change in the value of debt coming from changes in the value of the
government guarantee. The change in value of the guarantee, which reflects variation in
the credit risk of the sovereign (dP0
P0
), is concentrated primarily with debt and therefore not
captured adequately by the return on equity.
3.6.2 Two-way Feedback Revisited
Proposition 3 and Figure 4 show that with uncertainty about future output, the ‘spillover’
of the financial sector crisis onto the sovereign takes the form of a higher insolvency ratio H,
which is reflected in a lower sovereign bond price (and higher CDS rate). Once the insolvency
ratio H is increased, causing sovereign debt to become risky, negative shocks to sovereign
creditworthiness (e.g., shocks to growth and tax revenue R˜V ) then feed back onto the credit
risk of the financial sector by changing the value of its sovereign debt exposure– the transfer,
holdings of government bonds, and government guarantees. This feedback implies a post-
bailout increase in co-movement between sovereign and financial sector credit risk. This
increased co-movement contrasts with the immediate impact of the bailout announcement,
a reduction in financial sector credit risk and an increase in sovereign credit risk.
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4 Empirics
In this section we present empirical evidence in favor of the main arguments formalized in
our model: (1) bank bailouts reduced financial sector credit risk but were a key factor in
triggering the rise in sovereign credit risk of the developed countries, and (2) there is a
two-way feedback between the credit risk of the sovereign and the financial sector.
The setting for our empirical analysis is the financial crisis of 2007-10. We divide the crisis
into three separate periods relative to the bailouts: pre, around, and after. The pre-bailout
period, which culminated in Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy, saw a severe deterioration in
banks’ balance sheets, a substantial rise in the credit risk of financial firms, and a significant
loss in the market value of bank equity. This negative shock generated substantial debt
overhang in the financial sector and significantly increased the likelihood of failure of, or
runs on, financial institutions. We interpret this as setting the stage for the initial time
period in the model, and the bank bailouts as the sovereign’s response, per the model.
We present our empirical results in two parts. The first part focuses on point (1). We
present evidence that the bailouts transmitted risk from the banks to the sovereigns and
triggered a rise in sovereign credit risk across a broad cross-section of developed countries.
We then confirm a prediction of the model by documenting the post-bailout emergence of a
positive relationship between sovereign credit risk and government debt-to-gdp ratios. We
also analyze the ability of the pre-bailout credit risk of the financial sector and the pre-bailout
government debt-to-gdp ratio to predict post-bailout sovereign credit risk. This relationship
is predicted by the model and is supportive of the argument that the bailouts led to the
emergence of sovereign credit risk in developed countries.
The second part of our analysis focuses on point (2) by testing for the sovereign-bank two-
way feedback. We use a broad panel of bank and sovereign CDS data to carry out tests that
establish this channel and show that it is quantitatively important. A significant challenge
in demonstrating direct sovereign-bank feedback is the concern that another (unobserved)
factor directly affects both bank and sovereign credit risk, giving rise to co-movement between
them even in the absence of any direct feedback. We address these concerns by utilizing a
particularly useful feature of government ‘guarantees’–that they are targeted specifically at
bank debt holders. This allows us to control for bank fundamentals using equity returns and
establish the direct sovereign-bank feedback.
We also gather data on the sovereign bond holdings of European banks that were released
after the stress tests conducted in the first half of 2010. Using these data we show that
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bank holdings of foreign sovereign bonds have information about how sovereign credit risk
affects a bank’s credit risk. This result provides further evidence of a direct sovereign-to-
bank feedback because we control for country-specific macroeconomic changes by using the
change in value of foreign (rather than home) sovereign bonds.
We next describe the data construction and provide some summary statistics.
4.1 Data and Summary Statistics
We use Bankscope to identify all banks headquartered in Western Europe, the United States,
and Australia with more than $50 billion in assets as of the end of fiscal year 2006. We choose
this sample because smaller banks and banks outside these countries usually do not have
traded CDS. We then search for CDS in the database Datastream. We find CDS for 99
banks and match CDS to bank characteristics from Bankscope. Next, we search for equity
returns using Datastream. We find equity returns for 62 banks and match returns to CDS
and bank characteristics. Finally, we match these data to sovereign CDS (based on bank
headquarters) and OECD Economic Outlook data on public debt.
Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics for all banks with CDS prices. As of July
2007, the average bank had assets of $589.3 billion and equity of $26.8 billion. The average
equity ratio was 5.1% and the average Tier 1 ratio was 8.5%. The average bank CDS was
21.8 bps and the average sovereign CDS (if available as of July 2007) was 6.6 bps.
Panel B of Table 1 presents summary statistics of weekly changes in bank CDS and
sovereign CDS for the main bailout periods. We drop all observations with zero changes in
bank CDS or sovereign CDS to avoid stale data. All results presented below are robust to
including the dropped observations. Before the bank bailouts, the average bank CDS was
93.2 bps. The average sovereign CDS was only 13.5 bps, suggesting that financial market
participants did not anticipate large-scale bank bailouts prior to September 2008.
In the bailout period, we see a significant rise in both bank and sovereign credit risk with
average bank and sovereign CDS of 288.6 bps and 39.3 bps, respectively. Bank equity values
declined sharply during this period with a negative weekly return of 6.7%.
In the post-bailout period, average bank and sovereign CDS were 188.7 and 108.5 bps,
respectively. These CDS levels are suggestive of a significant transfer of financial sector
credit risk on sovereign balance sheets. We also find significant variation in sovereign CDS
with a standard deviation of weekly changes of 11.3%. This evidence suggests the emergence
of significant sovereign credit risk after the bank bailouts.
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4.2 The Sovereign Risk Trigger
4.2.1 Bank and Sovereign CDS
The first bank bailout announcement in Western Europe was on September 30, 2008 in
Ireland. We define the pre-bailout period as starting on January 1, 2007 and ending on
September 26, 2008. We start the period in January 2007 to include the increase in bank
credit risk because of the financial crisis. Note that the pre-bailout period includes the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 and the period immediately after-
wards, so that it includes the immediate effect of Lehman’s bankruptcy on other banks.
Hence, the pre-bailout period captures both the prolonged increase in bank credit risk dur-
ing 2007-2008 and the post-Lehman spike that occurs before the bank bailouts. To examine
bank and sovereign credit risk in this period, we analyze the country-level change in sovereign
and bank CDS. For each country, we compute the change in bank CDS as the unweighted
average of all banks with traded CDS.
Figure 5 summarizes the results for the pre-bailout period. For each country, the first
column depicts the change in sovereign CDS and the second column depicts the change in
bank CDS over the pre-bailout period. The figure shows that there is a large increase in
bank CDS during this period. For example, the average bank CDS in Ireland increased by
300 bps. However, there was almost no change in Ireland’s sovereign CDS. Overall, the figure
shows that the credit risk of the financial sector was greatly increased over the pre-bailout
period but that there was little impact on sovereign credit risk.13
Within one month after the Irish bailout was announced on September 30, 2008, almost
every Western European country announced a bank bailout. The bailouts typically consisted
of asset purchase programs, debt guarantees, and equity injections or some combination
thereof. The programs were substantial with estimated costs of 54% of GDP in Great
Britain, 28% of GDP in Germany, and 22% of GDP in the United States (Panetta et al.
(2009)). Several countries made more than one announcement during this period. Many
countries followed Ireland’s example in part to offset outflows from their own financial sectors
to newly secured financial sectors. As a result, the bank bailout announcements were not
truly independent. We therefore define the bailout period as the one-month period in which
13We note that some investors may have expected bank bailouts even before the first official announcement
on September 30, 2008. Such an expectation would reduce the observed increase in bank CDS and shift
forward in time the rise in sovereign CDS. To the extent that investors held such expectations prior to
September 30, 2008, they can explain the small rise in sovereign CDS that occurs late in the pre-bailout
period. However, the fact that the impact in this period is so small quantitatively suggest that the bank
bailouts were a surprise to the majority of investors.
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most bank bailouts were first announced.
Figure 6 plots the average change in bank CDS and sovereign CDS during the bailout
period. For most countries, bank CDS significantly decreased over this one-month period.
For example, the average bank CDS in Ireland decreased by about 150 bps. At the same
time, there is a significant increase in sovereign CDS. For example, the sovereign CDS of
Ireland increased by about 50 bps. Most other countries exhibit a similar pattern with
decreasing bank CDS and increasing sovereign CDS. The appearance of this striking pattern
across a broad cross-section of countries shows that the sovereigns responded to the distress
in the financial sector with the bailouts, achieving a substantial reduction in banks’ credit
risk. However, in accordance with our model, this caused a contemporaneous, immediate
increase in the sovereigns’ credit risk.
Next, we examine the period after the bailouts. We define the post-bailout period as
beginning after the end of the bank bailouts and ending in March 2010. We choose March
2010 because this is the date for which the European bank stress data results were released
but prior to large-scale interventions by the European Central Bank. The qualitative results
are robust to using later cut-off dates. Figure 7 plots the change in bank CDS and sovereign
CDS over the post-bailout period. We find that both sovereign CDS and bank CDS increased
across most countries. Moreover, bank CDS and sovereign CDS move together after the bank
bailouts, suggesting that they are tied together and potentially feedback on each other as
we further explore below.
4.2.2 Debt Ratios, Financial Distress and Sovereign CDS
Our model predicts that the increase in sovereign credit risk upon bailouts should depend
on the pre-bailout debt of the sovereign and the pre-bailout level of financial sector distress.
The model also suggests that there should be a positive relationship between sovereign credit
risk and measures of government debt-to-gdp after the bailout even if no such relationship
appears beforehand.
Figure 8 shows the relationship between debt-to-gdp ratio and sovereign CDS across
countries. The upper panel plots the relationship before the bailouts. The panel shows
almost no correlation between the two variables. The lower panel plots the relationship
after the bank bailouts. The panel shows a strong and positive relationship between the two
variables. These figures are highly suggestive of a link between public debt and sovereign
credit risk because of the bank bailouts.
To test this relationship more formally, we use data on sovereign CDS, financial sector
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distress, and government debt-to-gdp ratios. We measure pre-bailout financial sector distress
at the country level by averaging bank CDS on September 22, 2008. We choose this date
midway between Lehman’s bankruptcy and the first bailout announcement. We measure the
government debt-to-gdp ratio as the government gross liabilities as a percentage of gdp in
the year before the bailouts. For the post-bailout date we again choose March 31, 2010, the
reporting date for the European bank stress tests. We estimate the following regression:
yi = α + β(Pre-Bailout Debti) + γ log(Financial Sector Distressi) + εi
where the outcome variable yi is either the natural logarithm of sovereign CDS or the debt-
to-gdp ratio of country i.
Table 2 presents the result of our analysis. We first focus on the post-bailout results.
Column (3) finds that a 1% increase in the pre-bailout debt-to-gdp ratio leads to a 1.5%
increase in sovereign CDS post-bailout.14 Column (4) shows that a 1% increase in pre-bailout
financial sector distress increases post-bailout sovereign CDS by 0.965%. The coefficient on
debt-to-gdp decreases slightly but remains marginally significant. The R-squared of the
regression is close to 50%. These results suggest that pre-bailout financial sector distress
and sovereign’s debt-to-gdp ratio are highly predictive of post-bailout sovereign credit risk.
In contrast, Column (1) of Table 2 shows that in the pre-bailout period there is only a
very weak relationship between debt-to-gdp and sovereign CDS. The coefficient is small and
statistically insignificant. Column (2) shows that the coefficient on financial sector distress
in the pre-bailout period is also statistically insignificant.
From these results we can see that there emerged a relationship between debt-to-gdp and
sovereign credit risk that was not present beforehand. Note, moreover, that the emergence of
this relationship coincides with an overall rise in sovereign debt ratios. In the context of our
model, the sovereigns have raised their insolvency ratios H, so that dilution of existing debt
occurs, and there emerges a negative relationship between debt-to-gdp and the government
bond price (see Figure 4).
Column (5) examines the ability of pre-bailout financial sector distress to predict the
change in government debt-to-gdp from the pre-bailout to the post-bailout period. Consis-
14We make note of two points. First, the model predicts that the insolvency ratio H determines the level
of sovereign CDS. However, the debt-to-gdp ratio corresponds to θ0H in the model rather than simply H.
Nevertheless, the prediction of the model carries over to θ0H since θ0 is increasing in financial sector distress.
Second, debt-to-gdp ratios are an imperfect proxy for θ0H because H takes into account any future issuance
of debt to pay for current obligations related to the bailouts, whereas debt-to-gdp ratios are lagging. We
can address this to some extent by using the leading debt-to-gdp ratio.
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tent with the model, we find that financial sector distress is positively related to the increase
in debt-to-gdp. The coefficient is positive and marginally statistically significant. Column
(6) shows that post-bailout debt-to-gdp is predicted by pre-bailout debt-to-gdp and pre-
bailout financial sector distress. Both coefficients are statistically significant and together
the two variables explain 84% of the variation in post-bailout debt-to-gdp.
4.3 The Sovereign-Bank Feedback
This section analyzes the two-way feedback between sovereign and bank sector credit risk.
Once the sovereign opens itself up to credit risk due to bailouts, the price of its debt becomes
sensitive to macroeconomic shocks. Moreover, our model indicates that subsequent changes
in the sovereign’s credit risk should impact the financial sector’s credit risk through three
channels: (i) ongoing bailout payments and subsidies, (ii) direct holdings of government
debt, and (iii) explicit and implicit government guarantees. In our empirical analysis, we
estimate the aggregate effect of these three channels.
We start by estimating the following relationship in the post-bailout period:
∆ log(Bank CDSijt) = α + β∆ log(Sovereign CDSjt) + εijt
where ∆ log(Bank CDSijt) is the change in the log CDS of bank i headquartered in country
j from time t to time t − 1 and ∆ log(Sovereign CDSjt) is the change in the log Sovereign
CDS of country j from time t to time t − 1. At the weekly frequency, in the post-bailout
period the estimate of β is 0.47 and highly statistically signficant. This means that a 10%
increase in sovereign CDS is associated with a 4.7% increase in bank CDS. This result is
consistent with direct sovereign-to-bank feedback.
However, an obvious concern is that there is another (unobserved) factor that affects
both bank and sovereign credit risk. Such a factor could explain the co-movement without
there necessarily being an underlying direct channel between sovereign and bank credit risk.
More specifically, we interpret changes in sovereign credit risk as changes in expectations
about macroeconomic fundamentals, such as employment, growth, and productivity. These
fundamentals also have a direct effect on the value of bank assets such as mortgages or
bank loans. Hence, changes in macroeconomic conditions may generate a correlation be-
tween sovereign and bank credit risk even in the absence of the direct feedback mechanism.
Therefore, establishing that there is a direct feedback between sovereign and financial sector
credit risk is a significant empirical challenge.
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We use several strategies to address this concern. Our first strategy is to include three
sets of controls. First, we add controls that capture market-wide changes that affect both
bank and sovereign risk directly. Our market-wide controls are a CDS-market index and a
measure of aggregate volatility. Our CDS market index is the iTraxx Europe index, which is
comprised of 125 of the most liquid CDS names referencing European investment grade cred-
its. The CDS market index captures market-wide variation in CDS rates caused by changes
in fundamental credit risk, liquidity, and CDS-market specific shocks.15 For the volatility
index we follow the empirical literature and use a VIX-like index, the VDAX, which is the
German counterpart to the VIX index for the S&P 500. This captures changes in aggregate
volatility, which is an important factor in the pricing of credit risk. Second, we include
weekly fixed effects. The fixed effects captures (unobserved) variation that is common across
all banks. Third, we include bank-specific coefficients on all the control variables and bank
fixed effects. This accommodates potential non-linearities in the estimated relationships.
We implement this approach by estimating the following regression:
∆ log(Bank CDSijt) = αi + δt + β∆ log(Sovereign CDSjt) + γ∆Xijt + εijt
where ∆Xijt are the changes in the control variables from time t to time t− 1, δt are weekly
fixed effects, and αi are bank fixed-effects.
Table 3 shows the results for the pre-, around, and post-bailout period. For each period
there are three columns of results. The left column reports the coefficient after including the
market-wide control variables. The middle column adds the weekly fixed effects. The right
column adds bank fixed effects and bank-specific coefficients on controls.
Our main focus is on testing for the sovereign-to-bank feedback, so we examine the post-
bailout results first. Column (7) shows that β is positive, as expected, and highly statistically
significant. The magnitude is also economically important, implying that an increase in
sovereign CDS of 10% translates into a 2.21% increase in bank CDS. The control coefficients
are both statistically significant and the signs are as expected; an increase in aggregate CDS
levels or aggregate volatility is associated with a rise in bank CDS. Altogether, the variables
explain 33.8% of the variation in weekly bank CDS.
Column (8) adds the weekly fixed effects. The coefficient on sovereign CDS decreases but
15Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) find that a substantial part of the variation in corporate
credit spread changes is driven by a single factor that is independent of changes in risk factors or measures
of liquidity. They therefore conclude that this variation represents ‘local supply/demand shocks’ in the
corporate bond market.
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remains highly statistically significant. The decrease is not surprising, as time fixed effects
represent a rich set of controls. The weekly fixed effects are collinear with the market-wide
control variables; therefore, we do not estimate coefficients on the market-wide controls.
There is an increase in the R-squared of about 7.6% over column (7), indicating that most
of the unobserved market-wide variation was already captured by the market-wide controls.
Column (9) shows that the coefficient on sovereign CDS is essentially unchanged and
remains highly statistically significant after adding bank-specific coefficients on the market-
wide control variables. Given the flexibility of this specification, we interpret the coefficients
on sovereign CDS as robust evidence in favor of direct sovereign-to-bank feedback.
Comparing these results with those for the around-bailout period in columns (4)-(6) shows
interesting differences. For the around-bailout period, the coefficient on sovereign CDS is
negative after controlling for week fixed effects. In other words, in the around-bailout period
an increase in sovereign CDS is associated with a decrease in bank CDS. This is consistent
with the evidence for bank-to-sovereign feedback that the sovereigns took onto themselves
credit risk from their financial sectors during this phase. As shown in Column (6), the
coefficient is large and statistically significant with a 10% increase in sovereign CDS leading
to 12.9% decrease in bank CDS.
Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the pre-bailout period. They show small coefficients
on sovereign CDS that are indistinguishable from zero. As expected, in the pre-bailout
period there is no evidence for sovereign-bank feedbacks. In contrast, the CDS market
control coefficient is significant and has a large magnitude, as for the other periods.
We also provide a non-parametric illustration of this result. We add interactions of
month fixed-effects and sovereign CDS to the regression model describe above (including all
controls). Figure 9 plots the three-month moving average and the 95%-confidence interval of
the coefficients on the interactions.16 As shown in the figure, in the pre-bailout period there
is a a zero correlation (with relatively tight standard errors) between bank and sovereign
CDS. During the bailout period, the correlation turns negative and is highly statistically
significant with a coefficient of -0.3. After the bailout period, the coefficient is positive and
mostly statistically significant with a coefficient of around 0.12. This result lends further
support to our analysis of three distinct bailout periods.
16We construct the standard errors based on the estimated standard errors of the month fixed-effects
assuming a zero correlation of error terms across months.
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4.3.1 Controlling for Bank Fundamentals
The results above establish that there is a strong two-way sovereign-bank feedback. However,
there may remain a concern that our strategy to this point does not control for country-
specific macroeconomic shocks that affect both sovereign and credit risk. These shocks may
not be fully captured by our market-wide controls if they have a heterogenous impact across
countries.
We address this concern by employing a strategy that utilizes a particularly useful feature
of bank bailouts. Specifically, most bailouts were partly structured in the form of govern-
ment ‘guarantees’, which are targeted specifically at bank debt holders. This implies that
sovereign-specific shocks should have a disproportionate impact on debt holders because, in
addition to changing the value of bank assets, such shocks change the value of government
‘guarantees’ (implicit or explicit). Therefore, to establish whether there is direct sovereign-
to-bank feedback, we can test if sovereign CDS is a determinant of bank CDS even after we
control for the impact of shocks to bank fundamentals.
This empirical strategy is motivated by our guarantees model (Section 3.6), which shows
that bank equity returns are sufficient for determining changes in bank CDS in the absence
of government ‘guarantees’.17 This implies that once we control for bank equity returns
we should not find that changes in sovereign CDS have any further explanatory power for
changes in bank CDS. However, if one finds that sovereign CDS does have further explanatory
power for bank CDS beyond equity returns, then this is strongly supportive of a sovereign-
to-bank feedback channel. Proposition 4 shows that ‘guarantees’ present a source for such a
potential finding because they discriminate precisely in favor of debtholders. In the presence
of ‘guarantees’, a projection of changes in bank CDS that controls for equity returns should
still find a (positive) exposure on changes in sovereign CDS.
We therefore augment the regression with banks’ weekly equity returns. The estimates
are shown in Table 4. The structure is similar to Table 3. Columns (7)-(9) show that in
the post-bailout period the coefficient on sovereign CDS survives and is highly statistically
significant. As shown in columns (7) and (8), although the bank stock return coefficient
is highly statistically significant and possesses the expected negative sign, its inclusion has
little impact on the magnitude of the sovereign CDS coefficient. Column (9) includes bank-
specific coefficients on bank stock returns. The results show that the coefficient on sovereign
17This result is in fact quite general. It holds in models of defaultable bond pricing that build on the
canonical model of Merton (1974), where stock returns contain all information about changes in bank asset
values and therefore can (locally) capture all variation in the price of debt.
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CDS decreases somewhat but remains highly significant. We note that the coefficients in
Column (7) to (9) are slightly smaller than the comparable coefficients in Table 3. This is
consistent with small, positive benefits of bank bailouts to bank equity holders.18
For the bailout and pre-bailout periods, the results are quite similar to those in Table 3.
As shown in columns (1) to (6), we again find a negative coefficient on sovereign CDS in the
bailout period and an essentially zero coefficient in the pre-bailout period.
4.3.2 Bank-level Heterogeneity
To analyze further the sovereign-to-bank feedback, we also examine whether heterogeneity in
bank- and country-level characteristics affects banks’ sensitivity to changes in sovereign CDS
during the post-bailout period. To this end, we estimate the coefficient on an interaction
term of changes in sovereign CDS with bank and country-level variables.
We examine three variables. The first variable is the Tier 1 capital ratio, which is
commonly used in the banking industry as a proxy for a bank’s probability of solvency. This
specification is motivated by our theoretical result that the impact of changes in the value
of government guarantees should be stronger for less well-capitalized banks. We measure
Tier 1 capital ratio before the bailouts (as of January 2007) to avoid endogenous changes in
this variable as the result of bailouts. The second variable is the share of liabilities financed
with short-term debt (as of January 2007 from Bankscope). This variable captures a bank’s
need to roll over funding within less than a year. Intuitively, the impact of changes in the
value of government guarantees should be stronger for banks with larger short-term funding
needs. Again, we measure the variable as of January 2007. The third variable is the level of
sovereign credit risk. The impact of changes in the value of government guarantees should
be stronger for more risky sovereigns. Given that sovereign credit risk arose as a result of
the bailouts, we measure this variable using the natural logarithm of sovereign CDS lagged
by 12 weeks.
Table 5 reports the results. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term. Columns (1)
and (3) find that banks with higher Tier 1 ratios were less sensitive to variation in sovereign
18For the purposes of establishing the existence of a two-way feedback, we mainly focus on changes in bank
CDS. It is also interesting to look at the impact of bailouts on bank equity returns. From the viewpoint of
the model, bank equity returns should reflect changes in sovereign credit risk due to their impact on the value
of continuing bailout payments and banks’ holdings of government bonds. To that end, we also estimated all
our benchmark regression from Table 3 with equity returns as outcome variable. Indeed, we find a similar
relationship for bank equity returns as we find for bank CDS in Table 3 (as expected, the coefficient in the
post-bailout period has the opposite sign because a rise in sovereign CDS reduces equity returns). This
finding supports our assumption that equity returns are a suitable control for changes in bank fundamentals.
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CDS rates. As expected, all estimates are negative and the coefficient is statistically signifi-
cant once we control for the full set of control variables. Columns (4) to (6) find that banks
with a high share of liabilities financed with short-term debt are more sensitive to changes
in sovereign CDS. The result is statistically significant except for the last specification with
all controls. Columns (7) to (9) find that banks in countries with higher credit risk are more
sensitive to changes in sovereign CDS. The coefficient is stable in sign and magnitude across
specifications although only one of the specifications is statistically significant.
Overall, these results confirm that the bank-sovereign CDS relationship is stronger for
less well-capitalized banks, banks with more short-term debt, and banks located in countries
with higher credit risk.
4.3.3 Robustness
We conduct several other tests to ensure the robustness of our results. Our main regressions
are estimated at the weekly level. Estimation at the weekly level allows us to smooth out
measurement error that can bias our results. This is important in our context because we
are first-differencing our data, which magnifies any existing measurement error. However,
by using weekly level we may also allow for more (unobserved) omitted variables that can
affect our results. We therefore revisit our evidence in Tables 3 and 4 and estimate all
regressions at the daily level. We replace week fixed effects with day fixed effects. Panel A of
Table 6 presents the results without controlling for equity (Table 3) and Panel B presents the
results with controlling for equity (Table 4). We find qualitatively similar results to our main
specifications: there is no relationship in the pre-bailout period, a statistically significant and
negative relationship during the bailout period, and a statistically significant and positive
relationship during the post-bailout period. The estimates are on average about one third
smaller than the estimates with weekly data, which is consistent with some measurement
error in the first-differenced daily data.
We also note that our results are estimated using changes of log CDS. We choose this
specification because log changes are robust to the inclusion of outliers. Alternatively, we
can also estimate our results using arithmetic CDS changes. We find that our main results
are robust to using arithmetic CDS changes instead of log CDS changes. The only difference
is that the results with arithmetic changes are more sensitive to the inclusion of time fixed-
effects. This is not surprising because without time fixed-effects we rely on changes in the
CDS market index and the VDAX index to capture changes in general market conditions.
Given that these indices are necessarily expressed in percentage terms, this assumption is
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less likely to hold for arithmetic changes relative to log changes.19
4.4 European Bank Stress Test Analysis
As a final part of our analysis, we use data on the sovereign bond holdings of European
banks. These data were released as part of the European bank stress tests, which were
conducted in the first half of 2010. The data provide a view of a bank’s bond holdings of
both its own government bonds and those of other European countries.
We collect the stress test data from the websites of national bank regulators in Europe.
The data consists of bank characteristics and holdings of European sovereign bonds. A total
of 91 banks participated in the bank stress tests. These banks represent about 70 percent of
bank assets in Europe. For all banks, we search for CDS prices in the database Datastream.
Using bank names, we match 51 banks to CDS prices. Unmatched banks are mostly smaller
banks from Spain and Eastern Europe that do not have publicly quoted CDS prices. For
each bank we match sovereign holdings to sovereign CDS.
Table 7 presents summary statistics for all banks that participated in the stress tests.
As of March 2010, the average bank had risk-weighted assets of 126 billion euros and a Tier
1 capital ratio of 10.2%. The average holdings of gross and net European sovereign bonds
are 20.6 billion euros and 19.7 billion euros, respectively. Hence, the average bank holds
about one sixth of risk-weighted assets in sovereign bonds. Banks have a strong home bias
in their sovereign holdings: about 69.4% of bonds are issued by the country in which a bank
is headquartered. This is supportive of the model’s assumption that banks are significantly
exposed to home-country sovereign risk through their holdings of government bonds.
We use these data to conduct an alternative test of the impact of sovereign credit risk on
bank credit risk. Our test focuses on changes in the value of foreign-sovereign holdings rather
than own-country sovereign holdings. The benefit of this approach is that it circumvents the
usual concerns about omitted country-specific macro shocks.
To implement this test, we construct a bank-specific variable measuring variation in
the value of banks’ foreign sovereign bond holdings. Let SovBondik be the share of for-
19We note that the coefficients are consistent across specifications. For example, in the post-bailout period
we find a coefficient of 0.404 in the specification with arithmetic changes. This coefficient is about twice
as large as the coefficient (elasticity) in the specification with log CDS changes (Column (9) in Table 3).
Given that the elasticity should be the coefficient in the specification with arithmetic changes multiplied by
the ratio of bank CDS to sovereign CDS, this implies that the bank CDS should be about twice as large
as the sovereign CDS. Indeed, in the post-bailout period the average bank CDS is 188 bps and the average
sovereign CDS is 108 bps (Panel B in Table 1).
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eign sovereign holdings of country k by bank i. We calculate the foreign holdings variable,
ForeignBondCDSit as the following weighted average:
ForeignBondCDSit =
∑
i 6=j
SovBondik ∗ SovereignCDSkt
where SovereignCDSkt is the sovereign CDS of country k on day t. Note that for each bank
the foreign holdings variable excludes home-sovereign bonds. We then estimate the following:
∆ log(Bank CDSit) = δt + γ∆ log(ForeignBondCDSit) + εit (15)
where δt are time fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is γ, which captures the effect of
changes in the value of foreign bond holdings on bank CDS. We estimate the regressions
using the period one month before and one month after the reporting date for the sovereign
bond holdings. By estimating this regression, we are implicitly assuming that the marginal
CDS investor either knows or at least has some idea of the bank holdings.
Table 8 shows the results. Column (1) shows a positive and statistically significant asso-
ciation between changes in bank CDS and their foreign sovereign holdings. This coefficient
suggests that a one-standard deviation increase in the change in the foreign sovereign hold-
ings variable leads to an increase of about half of a one-standard deviation in the change of
the bank CDS. Column (2) shows that the coefficient remains unchanged when bank fixed
effects are included. Column (3) controls for week fixed effects. The coefficient of inter-
est decreases by about one third but remains statistically significant. This suggests that
common shocks affect both the change in bank CDS and the change in the foreign holdings
variable. Column (4) controls for day fixed effects. The coefficient decreases by two third
relative to the specification without time fixed effects but remains statistically significant
at the 1%-level. This result suggests that variation in foreign sovereign holdings contains
economically important information about variation in bank credit risk.
To further check for robustness, column (5) adds bank fixed effects in addition to day fixed
effects. This does not have any effect on the coefficient of interest. Column (6) estimates
the same regression as in Column (5) but excludes the holdings of German bonds from the
construction of the foreign-holdings variable. We do this to address a potential concern
about reverse causality due to the possibility that Germany may provide bailouts to other
countries, or banks in other countries. The column shows that this has no effect on the
coefficient of interest.
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4.5 The Case of Iceland: A Counterfactual?
We end by considering the case of Iceland. As is now well-known, by 2008 the Icelandic
banking sector was extremely highly leveraged and very large compared to the size of the
Icelandic economy. The three biggest Icelandic banks had active subsidiaries in the UK,
Scandinavia, and continental Europe. In late September 2008, fears of a run on the Ice-
landic banks led to their being put into receivership under the supervision of the Icelandic
government. At the very onset of this crisis, the Icelandic government moved to bailout
the first of its failing banks. However, it soon became clear that the government would
not be able to save the Icelandic banks under any circumstance. The outstanding debts
of the three biggest banks alone included over $62 billion in foreign currency obligations,
which was an order of magnitude bigger than Iceland’s 2007 GDP. Facing no possibility
of a successful bailout, the Icelandic government separated the domestic and international
parts of its banks’ operations. It kept the foreign liabilities within the failed lenders and
provided no support to banks’ foreign creditors (either bondholders or depositors). Hence,
Iceland’s banks became effectively bankrupt and indeed still owe creditors $85 billion today.
As the massive scale of these obligations show, it is very clear that Iceland was completely
incapable of bailing out its banks. The banking crisis was followed by high inflation, a large
depreciation in the currency, and a severe contraction of the Icelandic economy.
CDS rates on Euro-denominated Icelandic government obligations increased tremen-
dously with the onset of the crisis, reaching well over 1000 bps. This reflected the market’s
fear that the foreign-currency obligations of the banks would in some ways be taken on by
the government, as Iceland’s pre-crisis foreign-currency obligations were not very large.20.
In this sense, the rise in Icelandic credit risk corresponds well with the model presented
by this paper. Since bank obligations were denominated in foreign currency, the Icelandic
government would need to fund any transfers in foreign currency as well. The default risk
associated with these obligations was reflected in the traded CDS on Euro-denominated
Icelandic bonds.
Ultimately, Iceland did not take on significant foreign obligations from its banking sec-
tor. Perhaps this was due to the tremendous magnitude of these obligations relative to its
20The credit-rating agencies precisely expressed this concern as they downgraded Iceland’s sovereign debt
in 2008, with Moody’s stating that “the Icelandic authorities’ resolution not to save the whole banking
system at the cost of jeopardizing the government’s creditworthiness – reflected in decisions damaging to
bank creditors’ interests – is fraught with operational difficulties”, and “’some of the banks’ external liabilities
will eventually filter through to the government’s balance sheet”’ (Moody’s Investors Services, 8 October
2008)
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resources. Within our model, we can interpret this outcome as the corner solution that arises
when the government is incapable of increasing the financial sector’s probability of solvency
(psolv) above zero for any level of taxation and corresponding transfer. Under such circum-
stances it is optimal within the model for the government to avoid increasing outstanding
debt or giving any transfer to the financial sector.
Figure 10 shows that subsequently, Iceland CDS rates have decreased tremendously. The
figure compares the sovereign CDS of Iceland with that of Ireland. It shows that Iceland
CDS rates are now significantly below those of Ireland. Note that, by all estimates, Iceland
has experienced a contraction in output that is greater than that of Ireland, so that this
difference does not reflect Iceland’s greater economic performance over the subsequent period.
In that sense, Figure 10 serves as a counterfactual supporting the inference that if sovereigns
abstained from financial sector bailouts, they would face lower sovereign credit risk.
5 Related literature
Our paper is related to three different strands of literature: (i) the theoretical literature on
bank bailouts; (ii) the literature on costs of sovereign default; and, (iii) the recent empirical
literature on effects of bank bailouts on sovereigns.
The theoretical literature on bank bailouts has mainly focused on how to structure bank
bailouts efficiently. While the question of how necessarily involves an optimization with
some frictions, the usual friction assumed is the inability to resolve failed bank’s distress
entirely due to agency problems. This could be due to under-investment problem as in our
setup (e.g., Philippon and Schnabl, 2009), adverse selection (e.g., Gorton and Huang, 2004),
risk-shifting or asset substitution (e.g., Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2008, Diamond and
Rajan, 2009), or tradeoff between illiquidity and insolvency problems (e.g., Diamond and
Rajan, 2005). Some other papers (Philippon and Schnabl, 2009, Bhattacharya and Nyborg,
2010, among others) focus on specific claims through which bank bailouts can be structured
to limit these frictions.
Our paper instead focuses on the cost and benefit of bank bailouts. A large body of
existing literature in banking analyzes the ex-ante moral hazard cost of bank bailouts at
the individual-bank level (Mailath and Mester, 1994) and at the collective level through
herding (Penati and Protopapadakis, 1988, Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). Aghion, Bolton
and Fries (1999) consider the cost that bank debt restructuring can in some cases delay the
recognition of loan losses. Brown and Dinc (2009) show empirically that the governments
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are more likely to rescue a failing bank when the banking system, as a whole, is weak.
Only a small part of this literature, however, does consider ex-post costs of bailouts as
we do. Notably, Diamond and Rajan (2005, 2006) study how bank bailouts can take away
a part of the aggregate pool of liquidity from safe banks and endanger them too. Acharya
and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008) and Philippon and Schnabl (2009) assume, in a reduced-form
manner, a cost of bank bailouts to the government that is increasing in the quantity of
bailout funds. As a possible motivation they provide taxation-related fiscal costs, which we
derive endogenously. Panageas (2010a,b) considers the optimal taxation to fund bailouts in
a continuous-time dynamic setting, also highlighting when banks might be too big to save.
Bolton and Jeanne (2011) analyze contagion of sovereign crises in financially integrated
economies. They find that banks diversify sovereign debt holdings, which provides ex-ante
risk diversification benefits but generates the risk of contagion ex-post. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009a, b) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) document empirically that economic activity
remains in deep slump “after the fall” (that is, after a financial crisis), and private debt
shrinks significantly while sovereign debt rises. These effects are potentially all consistent
with our model of how financial sector bailouts affect sovereign credit risk and economic
growth.
In the theoretical literature on sovereign defaults, Bulow and Rogoff (1989a, 1989b) ini-
tiated a body of work that focused on ex-post costs to sovereigns of defaulting on external
debt, e.g., due to reputational hit in future borrowing, imposition of international trade
sanctions and conditionality in support from multi-national agencies. Broner and Ventura
(2005), Broner, Martin and Ventura (2007), Acharya and Rajan (2010) and Gennaioli, Mar-
tin and Rossi (2010), among others, consider a collateral damage to the financial institutions
and bond markets when a sovereign defaults. They employ this as a possible commitment
device that gives the sovereign “willingness to pay” its creditors. Our model considers both
of these effects, an ex-post deadweight cost of sovereign default in external markets as well
as an internal cost to the financial sector through bank holdings of government bonds.
One strand of recent empirical work focuses on the distortionary design of bank bailout
packages. Acharya and Sundaram (2009) document how the loan guarantee program of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the Fall of 2008 was charged in a manner
that favored weaker banks at the expense of safer ones, producing a downward revision in
CDS spreads of the former. Veronesi and Zingales (2009) conduct an event study of the
U.S. government intervention in October 2008 through TARP and find that the government
intervention increased the value of banks by over $100 billion, primarily of bank creditors,
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but also estimate a tax payer cost between $25 to $47 billion. Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010)
examine the government bailout of U.S. money market funds after the Lehman bankruptcy
and find that less well-capitalized money market fund sponsors benefited more from the
bailouts. Panetta et al. (2009) and King (2009) assess the Euro zone bailouts and reach
the conclusion that while bank equity was wiped out in most cases, bank creditors were
backstopped reflecting a waiting game on part of bank regulators and governments. Laeven
and Valencia (2010) put together a time-series of banking crises and examine their economic
costs. They too find that the median output loss of recent banking crises was large and
accounted for about 25% of GDP.
Another strand of recent empirical work relating financial sector and sovereign credit
risk during the ongoing crisis shares some similarity to our paper. Sgherri and Zoli (2009),
Attinasi, Checherita and Nickel (2009), Alter and Schueler (2011), Mody and Sandri (2011),
and Ejsing and Lemke (2011) focus on the effect of bank bailouts on sovereign credit risk
measured using CDS spreads. Some of their evidence mirrors our descriptive evidence.
Dieckmann and Plank (2009) analyze sovereign CDS of developed economies around the
crisis and document a significant rise in co-movement following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) do an international study of equity prices
and CDS spreads around bank bailouts and show that some large banks may be too big to
save rather than too big to fail. Our analysis corroborates and complements some of this
work. In particular, our empirical investigation of banking sector holdings of government
debt, identifying the effect of government guarantees, and how to introduce a linkage between
bank CDS and sovereign CDS is novel.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the intimate and intricate link between bank bailouts and sovereign
credit risk. In our model, the government faces an important trade-off: bank bailouts ame-
liorate the under-investment problem in the financial sector but reduce the investment in-
centives of the non-financial sector due to the corresponding increase in future taxation. In
the short-run, bailouts are funded through the issuance of government bonds. A high level
of issuance helps to fund the bailout but dilutes existing bondholders and introduces credit
risk into the government bond price. This creates a two-way feedback between sovereign and
financial sector credit risk because financial firms are exposed to the value of government
debt through both their direct bond holdings and via the value of explicit government guar-
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antees or an implicit safety net. Using bank and sovereign credit default swap data from the
financial crisis of 2007 to 2010, we provide strong evidence of such a two-way feedback.
Overall, we consider the emergence of meaningful sovereign credit risk as an important
potential cost of bank bailouts. This cost of bailouts can render the immediate stabilization
of the financial sector a Pyrrhic victory, but it has received little theoretical attention and
has also not been analyzed much empirically. Taking cognizance of this ultimate cost of
bailouts has important consequences for the future resolution of financial crises, the design
of fiscal policy, and the nexus between the two.
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Figure 2: The Default Boundary (Certainty Case)
Default and No−Default Regions
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Figure 2 shows the Default and No-Default Regions in the space L1 ×ND (severity of
debt overhang× pre-bailout government debt) for the model under certainty. The black
curve separating these two regions gives the default boundary. The plot corresponds to
a parameterization of the model where A˜1 ∼ U [0, 1], L1 = 0.5, α = 1, ϑ = 0.3, γ = 0.2,
β = 0.5, m = 1.3, D = 0.02, kA = 0, and ND = 0.25.
Figure 3: Marginal Gain and Loss of Increasing H
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The top panel of Figure 3 plots the marginal gain dG/dH (solid line and dash-dot line)
of increasing the insolvency ratio H, holding constant expected tax revenues T . The
dash-dot line corresponds to a higher level of L1 than the solid line. The top panel
also shows the corresponding marginal increase in expected dead-weight default cost
D
d pdef
dH (dashed line). The bottom panel of the Figure shows the resulting value of the
government’s objective function, with the the solid and dash-dot lines corresponding
to their counterparts in the top panel. The plots correspond to a parameterization of
the model where R˜V ∼ U [0.6, 1.4], A˜1 ∼ U [0, 1], L1 = 0.5 (solid line), α = 1, ϑ = 0.3,
γ = 0.2, β = 0.5, m = 1.3, D = 0.06, kA = 0, and ND = 0.25.
Figure 4: Comparative Statics for L1
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Figure 4 plots the equilibrium values for expected tax revenue T , the insolvency ratio
H, the transfer T0, and the sovereign bond price P0, as the severity of debt overhang
L1 (top panel) and pre-bailout government debt ND (bottom panel) are varied. The
dotted line in the plots represents the point at which total default (H →∞) is optimal,
resulting in a discontinuity in the plot. The parameters of the model correspond to
those in Figure 3.
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Figure 8: Correlation between Sovereign CDS and Public Debt before and after Bank
Bailouts
 
 
Figure 8 shows the correlation between sovereign CDS (in basis points) and public
liabilities (as a percentage of GDP) for Western European countries before and after
the bank bailouts. The top figure shows no correlation before the bailouts (as of
3/1/2007). The bottom figure shows a strong correlation after the bank bailouts (as
of 3/1/2010). The CDS data are from Datastream and the public liabilities data are
from the OECD Economic Outlook database.
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics  
The sample shows summary statistics on bank and sovereign credit risk.  The sample includes all 
European, U.S., and Australian banks with available data on bank CDS, sovereign CDS, and equity 
returns.  The data are at the weekly level.  Panel A presents summary statistics for the first week of July 
2007.  Panel B presents summary statistics for the period before, around, and after the bailouts. 
 
Panel A: Cross-Section (7/1/2007) 
   # Mean Std.Dev 50th percentile 5th percentile 95th percentile 
Assets ($ billion) 81 589.3 594.9 362.6 77.9 1,896.90
Equity ($ billion) 81 26.8 29.3 20.2 3.5 112.4
Equity Ratio (%) 81 5.1 2.7 4.8 1.9 10
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 66 8.5 1.9 8.2 6.5 12.4
Bank CDS (bp) 75 21.8 13.4 10.5 6.5 41
Sovereign CDS (bp) 56 6.6 11.5 2 1.5 52.1
Panel B: Time-Series  
Pre-Bailout  (1/1/2007-9/17/2008) 
   # Mean Std.Dev 50th percentile 5th percentile 95th percentile 
Bank CDS (bp) 2,891 93.2 129 67.7 6.6 271.2
Sovereign CDS (bp) 2,891 13.5 12.1 9.6 1.8 38.3
∆ Bank CDS (%) 2,891 0.038 0.247 0.025 -0.242 0.329
∆ Sovereign CDS (%) 2,891 0.024 0.3 0.028 -0.256 0.318
Bank Stock Return (%) 2,891 -0.011 0.084 -0.006 -0.116 0.081
∆ CDS Market Index (%) 2,891 0.021 0.118 0.005 -0.141 0.211
∆ Volatility (%) 2,891 0.003 0.032 0.002 -0.038 0.043
Bailout  (9/18/2008-10/22/2008) 
Bank CDS (bp) 254 288.6 626.0 133.3 70.0 740.0
Sovereign CDS (bp) 254 39.3 18.8 32.5 12.5 73.5
∆ Bank CDS (%) 254 -0.065 0.44 -0.037 -0.629 0.405
∆ Sovereign CDS (%) 254 0.146 0.19 0.129 -0.105 0.502
Bank Stock Return (%) 254 -0.067 0.268 -0.03 -0.374 0.201
∆ CDS Market Index (%) 254 0.017 0.095 0.04 -0.157 0.116
∆ Volatility (%) 254 0.048 0.071 0.076 -0.036 0.127
Post-Bailout (10/23/2008 - 30/4/2011) 
Bank CDS (bp) 6,500 188.7 179.9 131.2 65.5 560.6
Sovereign CDS (bp) 6,500 108.5 142.9 60.1 24.9 347
∆ Bank CDS (%) 6,500 0.003 0.12 -0.001 -0.158 0.184
∆ Sovereign CDS (%) 6,500 0.004 0.113 0.003 -0.181 0.186
Bank Stock Return (%) 6,500 0 0.098 0.002 -0.132 0.129
∆ CDS Market Index (%) 6,500 -0.002 0.071 -0.006 -0.113 0.117
∆ Volatility (%) 6,500 -0.003 0.048 -0.004 -0.059 0.06
Table 2:  Emergence of Sovereign Credit Risk  
This table shows the relation between sovereign credit risk, public debt-to-gdp, and financial sector distress.  The sample includes Australia, 
Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and all Eurozone countries with publicly available data on sovereign CDS and bank CDS.  
The data are at the country-level.  The independent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is the sovereign CDS before the bank bailouts (as of 1/1/2008).  
Columns (1) and (2) control for Pre-bailout Debt (debt-to-gdp ratio) measured as Government Liabilities as share of GDP (collected from the 
OECD Economic Outlook).  Column (2) controls for financial sector distress measured as the natural logarithm of the average banks CDS before 
the bank bailouts (as of 9/22/2008).  The independent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is the sovereign CDS after the bank bailouts (as of 
3/31/2010).  The dependent variables are the same as in Columns (1) and (2), respectively.  The independent variable in Column (5) is the change 
in the debt-to-gdp ratio from June 2008 to June 2010.  The dependent variable is financial sector distress.  The independent variable in column (6) 
is the debt-to-gdp ratio in June 2010.  The dependent variables are the pre-bailout debt-to-GDP ratio and financial sector distress.  We report 
robust standard errors.  ** 1% significant, * 5% significant, and + 10% significant 
  
  Log (Sovereign CDS)   Debt-to-GDP 
Pre-Bailout Post-Bailout Post-Bailout 
1/1/2008 3/31/2010 ∆ 2008-2010 3/31/2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
                
Pre-Bailout Debt-to-GDP 0.006 0.005 0.015* 0.013+ 1.107** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.144) 
Pre-Bailout Financial Sector Distress 0.311 0.965* 20.118+ 21.726+ 
(0.208) (0.357) (10.168) (11.555) 
Constant 2.137** 0.601 3.112** -1.593 -86.920 -101.548 
(0.320) (1.154) (0.401) (2.019) (49.456) (60.923) 
Observations 15 14 17 15 15 15 
R-squared 0.134 0.171 0.261 0.488   0.364 0.843 
 
  
Table 3:  Change in Bank and Sovereign Credit Risk 
This table shows the effect of sovereign credit risk on bank credit risk during the financial crisis.  The sample includes all European, U.S., and 
Australian banks with available data on bank and sovereign CDS.  The data are at the weekly level.  Columns (1) to (3) cover the pre-bailout 
period (1/1/2007-9/17/2008), Columns (4) to (6) cover the bailout period (9/18/2008-10/22/2008), and Columns (7) to (9) cover the post-bailout 
period (10/23/2008-04/30/2011).  The dependent variable is the weekly change in the natural logarithm of bank CDS.  The main independent 
variable is the weekly change in the sovereign CDS.  The sovereign CDS is assigned based on the country where the bank is headquartered.  The 
control variables are the change in the CDS market index and the volatility index.  Columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), and (9) include week fixed 
effects.  Column (3), (6), (9) include bank fixed effects and interactions of bank fixed effects with the change in CDS market index and the 
volatility index. The standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.  ** 1% significant, * 5% significant, and + 10% significant 
 
 
  ∆  Log(Bank CDS) 
Pre-Bailout  Bailout   Post-Bailout  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
∆  Log(Sovereign CDS) 0.017 0.003 0.003 0.448* -0.715* -1.293** 0.221** 0.163** 0.163** 
(0.010) (0.016) (0.017) (0.169) (0.282) (0.387) (0.026) (0.035) (0.033) 
∆  Log(CDS Market Index) 0.962** 0.893** 0.722** 
(0.043) (0.216) (0.034) 
∆ Volatility Index 0.671** -0.946** 0.057 
(0.113) (0.238) (0.051) 
Week FE N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Interactions N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Observations 2,891 2,891 2,891 254 254 254 6,500 6,500 6,500 
Banks 62 62 62 53 53 53 59 59 59 
R-squared 0.262 0.344 0.476 0.114 0.256 0.599 0.338 0.414 0.479 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Change in Bank and Sovereign Credit Risk (controlling for Equity Return) 
This table shows the effect of sovereign credit risk on bank credit risk during the financial crisis.  The sample includes all European, U.S., and 
Australian banks with available data on bank CDS, sovereign CDS, and equity returns.  The data are at the weekly level. Columns (1) to (3) cover 
the pre-bailout period (1/1/2007-9/17/2008), Columns (4) to (6) cover the bailout period (9/18/2008-10/22/2008), and Columns (7) to (9) cover the 
post-bailout period (10/23/2008-04/30/2011).  The dependent variable is the weekly change in the natural logarithm of bank CDS.  The main 
independent variable is the weekly change in the sovereign CDS.  The sovereign CDS is assigned based on the country where the bank is 
headquartered.  The control variables are the change in the CDS market index, the change in the volatility index, and equity return.  Columns (2), 
(3), (5), (6), (8), and (9) include week fixed effects.  Column (3), (6), (9) include bank fixed effects and interactions of bank fixed effects with the 
change in CDS Market index, the change in volatility index, and equity return.  The standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.   ** 1% 
significant, * 5% significant, and + 10% significant 
 
  ∆  Log(Bank CDS) 
Pre-Bailout  Bailout   Post-Bailout  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
∆  Log(Sovereign CDS) 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.449** -0.691** -1.020 0.197** 0.153** 0.146** 
(0.010) (0.016) (0.018) (0.164) (0.257) (1.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.033) 
Equity Return -0.306* -0.211 -0.194 -0.104  -0.145** -0.095** 
(0.142) (0.140) (0.185) (0.181)  (0.030) (0.030) 
∆  Log(CDS Market Index) 0.932** 0.753** 0.688** 
(0.048) (0.200) (0.031) 
∆ Volatility Index 0.429** -1.100** -0.027 
(0.134) (0.207) (0.052) 
Week FE N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Interactions N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Observations 2,891 2,891 2,891 254 254 254 6,500 6,500 6,500 
Banks 62 62 62 53 53 53 59 59 59 
R-squared 0.271 0.347 0.517 0.126 0.259 0.854 0.349 0.417 0.495 
 
 
Table 5:  Change in Bank and Sovereign Credit Risk (Interactions)  
This table shows the effect of sovereign credit risk on bank credit risk during the financial crisis.  The sample includes all European, U.S., and 
Australian banks with available data on bank CDS and share prices.  The data are at the weekly level for the post-bailout period (10/23/2008-
04/30/2011).  The dependent variable is the weekly change in the natural logarithm of bank CDS.  Columns (1) to (3) include the interaction of the 
share of liabilities financed with short-term debt (“Short-term debt”) and the change in sovereign CDS. Columns (4) to (6) include the interaction 
of the regulatory Tier 1 Ratio (“Tier 1 Ratio”) and the change in sovereign CDS.  Columns (7) to (9) include the interaction of the natural 
logarithm of sovereign CDS lagged by 12 weeks (“Lag Sov CDS”) and the change in sovereign CDS.  All columns include the main effects.  All 
other controls are the same as in Table 3.  The standard errors are clustered at the bank-level.  ** 1% significant, * 5% significant, and + 10% 
significant 
 
  ∆  Log(Bank CDS) 
Post-Bailout  Post-Bailout  Post-Bailout  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
∆  Log(Sovereign CDS)*Tier 1 Ratio -0.024 -0.024 -0.032+ 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
∆  Log(Sovereign CDS)*Short-term debt    0.418* 0.383+ 0.102    
    (0.204) (0.193) (0.205)    
∆  Log(Sovereign CDS)*Lagged Sov. CDS    0.065+ 0.046 0.057 
(0.038) (0.045) (0.049) 
Main Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Other Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Week FE N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Interactions N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Observations 5,154 5,154 5,154 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,464 6,464 6,464 
Bank 47 47 47 59 59 59 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.342 0.416 0.475 0.340 0.415 0.479 0.361 0.444 0.506 
 
Table 6:  Change in Bank and Sovereign Credit Risk – Robustness (daily data) 
This table replicates Table 3 (Panel A) and Table 4 (Panel B) for daily data instead of weekly data.  We replace week fixed effects with day fixed 
effects.  The coefficients on the control variables are not shown.  ** 1% significant, * 5% significant, and + 10% significant 
 
  Panel A: Main Specification 
Pre-Bailout  Bailout Post-Bailout 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
∆  Log(Sovereign CDS) 0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.166 -0.380** -0.367* 0.209** 0.105** 0.099**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.100) (0.114) (0.167) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) 
Day FE N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Interactions N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Observations 10,673 10,673 10,673 1,017 1,017 1,017 28,736 28,736 28,736 
Banks 62 62 62 53 53 53 59 59 59 
R-squared 0.115 0.216 0.240 0.092 0.227 0.350 0.249 0.345 0.383 
Panel B: Controlling for Equity 
Pre-Bailout  Bailout Post-Bailout 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
∆  Log(Sovereign CDS) 0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.137 -0.389** -0.371** 0.193** 0.098** 0.093**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.105) (0.105) (0.119) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) 
Day FE N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Interactions N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Observations 10,673 10,673 10,673 1,017 1,017 1,017 28,736 28,736 28,736 
Banks 62 62 62 53 53 53 59 59 59 
R-squared 0.124 0.220 0.255 0.150 0.249 0.703 0.258 0.349 0.401 
 
Table 7: Summary Statistics of European Bank Stress Test Sample  
The table shows summary statistics for all banks that participated in the EU Bank Stress Tests from July 
2010.  The data was collected from the website of the Committee of European Banking Regulators and 
nation websites of the respective bank regulators.  The sovereign holdings are computed as the total value 
of sovereign holdings relative to risk-weighted assets.   We report both the gross and net exposure as 
reported to bank regulators.  The share of trading book and banking book are the share of sovereign 
holdings held in the respective book.  The shares are computed based on gross exposure (net exposure 
was not reported). 
 
Sovereign Holdings 
Euro Bank Stress Tests Sample, March 31, 2010 
  N Mean Std.Dev 
50th 
Percentile 
5th 
Percentile 
95th 
Percentile 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Bank Characteristics       
 
Risk-weighted Assets (EUR 
million) 91 126,337 179,130 63,448 3,269 493,307
 Tier 1 Capital Ratio (%) 91 10.2 2.4 9.8 7.2 14.4
Sovereign Exposure       
 
Sovereign Holdings (gross, 
EUR million) 91 20,668 27,948 7,930 105 81,765
 
Sovereign Holdings (net, 
EUR million) 91 19,719 27,329 6,960 105 78,959
 
Home Sovereign Holdings 
(gross, EUR million) 91 11,493 14,422 5,774 182 42,800
 
Home Sovereign Holdings 
(net, EUR million) 91 11,023 13,956 5,348 117 42,800
 Home Share (%) 91 69.4 30.0 81.6 18.9 100
 Greek Sovereign Holdings 91 669 2,844 0 0 5,601
 Share Banking Book (%) 91 84.9 19.9 92.2 35.4 100.0
        
 
  
Table 8:  Analysis of Change in Sovereign Exposure  
 
The table shows regression of change in bank CDS on change in exposure to sovereign bank holdings. 
The sovereign bond holdings data were collected from the website of the Committee of European 
Banking Regulators and nation websites of the respective bank regulators. We construct the exposure 
variable as the weighted average of country CDS with sovereign holdings as weights. Changes are 
computed as log changes. The data covers the period from 3/1/2010 to 4/30/2010. Columns (2), (5) and 
(6) include bank fixed effects. Column (3) includes week fixed effects. Column (4) to (6) include day 
fixed effect. The exposure variable in Column (6) excludes German bonds. The standard errors are 
clustered at the bank-level (51 banks). ** 1% significant, * 5% significant, and +10% significant 
 
  Change in Bank CDS 
Sample All All All All All 
Excluding 
Germany 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Change in Sovereign 
Exposure 0.325** 0.326** 0.261** 0.141** 0.135** 0.137** 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046) 
Bank FE N Y N N Y Y 
Week FE N N Y N N N 
Day FE N N N Y Y Y 
Observations 2,317 2,317 2,317 2,317 2,317 2,317 
Banks 51 51 51 51 51 0.357 
R-squared 0.173 0.188 0.228 0.342 0.357 0.357 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.173 0.170 0.224 0.329 0.329 0.329 
 
